Discussion of The Role of Accruals in Asymmetrically Timely Gain and Loss Recognition by Guay, Wayne R
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Accounting Papers Wharton Faculty Research
5-2006
Discussion of The Role of Accruals in
Asymmetrically Timely Gain and Loss
Recognition
Wayne R. Guay
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/accounting_papers
Part of the Accounting Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/accounting_papers/58
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Guay, W. R. (2006). Discussion of The Role of Accruals in Asymmetrically Timely Gain and Loss Recognition. Journal of Accounting
Research, 44 (2), 243-255. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679X.2006.00199.x
Discussion of The Role of Accruals in Asymmetrically Timely Gain and
Loss Recognition
Abstract
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) augment existing models of expected accruals to incorporate conditional
conservatism. They document a robust asymmetry in the relation between accruals and economic losses and
gains, and demonstrate that accruals models that incorporate this asymmetry have increased explanatory
power. This discussion of Ball and Shivakumar (2005) makes five main points: 1) incorporating asymmetry in
gain and loss recognition is an important contribution to empirical models of expected accruals; 2) the
economic underpinnings of asymmetry in loss and gain recognition remain open to considerable debate; 3)
the extent to which accruals recognize gains in a timely manner remains an interesting but unanswered
question; 4) non-working capital accruals are important to both the earnings process and accounting
conservatism, yet modeling of nonworking capital accruals has received little attention in the literature; and 5)
incorporating asymmetry into the accruals process has important implications for estimating discretionary
accruals and for future research in this area.
Disciplines
Accounting
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/accounting_papers/58
 1
Discussion of Ball and Shivakumar (2005): 
The role of accruals in asymmetrically timely gain and loss recognition 
 
 
 
Wayne Guay1 
The Wharton School 
University of Pennsylvania 
1300 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall 
Email: guay@wharton.upenn.edu 
Phone: (215) 898-7775 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) augment existing models of expected accruals to incorporate 
conditional conservatism. They document a robust asymmetry in the relation between accruals 
and economic losses and gains, and demonstrate that accruals models that incorporate this 
asymmetry have increased explanatory power.  
 
This discussion of Ball and Shivakumar (2005) makes five main points: 1) incorporating 
asymmetry in gain and loss recognition is an important contribution to empirical models of 
expected accruals; 2) the economic underpinnings of asymmetry in loss and gain recognition 
remain open to considerable debate; 3) the extent to which accruals recognize gains in a timely 
manner remains an interesting but unanswered question; 4) non-working capital accruals are 
important to both the earnings process and accounting conservatism, yet modeling of non-
working capital accruals has received little attention in the literature; and 5) incorporating 
asymmetry into the accruals process has important implications for estimating discretionary 
accruals and for future research in this area. 
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1. Introduction 
The accrual process is central to financial accounting. Accruals adjust cash flows to 
reported earnings and form the building blocks for the balance sheet. Given the importance of 
accruals to financial accounting, it is surprising how sparse the modeling of the overall accrual 
process has been within the literature. Until recently, the “state of the art” empirical approach 
modeled total accruals as a function of the change in sales and PP&E (Jones, 1991). Recently, 
working capital accruals have been more formally modeled as a function of firms’ selling 
activity and past, present, and future operating cash flows (e.g., Dechow, Kothari and Watts, 
1998; Dechow and Dichev, 2002). 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) incorporate conditional conservatism, an important feature 
of the earnings process, into existing accruals models. Specifically, they recognize that accruals 
are expected to be an asymmetric function of firm performance in which economic losses are 
captured by the accruals process in a more timely manner than gains. Their evidence documents 
a robust asymmetry in the relation between accruals and economic losses and gains, and 
demonstrates that accruals models that incorporate this asymmetry have increased explanatory 
power. The authors’ innovation advances research on modeling the accruals process and is sure 
to play an important role in accounting research on both nondiscretionary and discretionary 
components of accruals. 
This discussion begins in Section 2 by reviewing existing models of expected accruals.  
Section 3 illustrates the role of accruals in recognizing gains and losses and argues that the extent 
to which accruals recognize gains in a timely manner remains an interesting but unanswered 
question. In Section 4, I discuss the authors’ main tests and contributions to our understanding of 
the asymmetric recognition of losses and gains. I also argue that the economic underpinnings of 
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asymmetry in loss and gain recognition remain open to considerable debate.  Section 5 briefly 
ties the authors' work into extant research on estimating discretionary accruals and provides 
avenues for future research. Section 6 offers concluding remarks. 
 
2. Models of expected accruals 
The accruals model developed by Jones (1991), one of three models examined by Ball 
and Shivakumar, is an early attempt to empirically describe the accrual process. Somewhat 
surprisingly, this early model is still widely used by researchers to estimate expected accruals 
and deviations from expected accruals. The Jones model relies on the fundamental notions that 
working capital accruals, such as receivables and inventory, are expected to increase with sales, 
and that long-term accruals, such as depreciation, are expected to increase with investments in 
plant, property and equipment. Because growth in receivables and inventory increases earnings 
relative to operating cash flows, and depreciation expense decreases earnings relative to cash 
flows, α1 is predicted to be positive, and α2 is predicted to be negative in the following 
specification: 
 
Jones model:  ACCt =α0 + α1∆REVt + α2GPPEt +εt      (1) 
 
where ACC is total accruals (i.e., earnings minus operating cash flows), ∆REV is the one-period 
change in revenues, and GPPE is the gross value of plant, property, and equipment. 
The other two models examined by Ball and Shivakumar, one relying on work by 
Dechow, Kothari, and Watts (DKW, 1998) and the other developed by Dechow and Dichev (DD, 
2002), are based on the fundamental idea that working capital accruals improve the 
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informativeness of earnings by smoothing out transitory fluctuations in working capital cash 
flows, such as inventory and accounts receivable. For example, consider a buildup in inventory 
in the previous period that is sold on account in the current period and subsequently collected in 
cash the next period. Consequently, operating cash flow is negative last period, zero in the 
current period when the earnings process is actually completed, and positive next period.  Such 
transitory fluctuations make operating cash flows a less informative measure of firm 
performance than earnings (e.g., see Dechow, 1994). Ball and Shivakumar refer to this as the 
“noise reduction” role of accruals. Thus, these models emphasize the relation between accruals 
and past, current, and future operating cash flows as follows: 
 
Cash flow (CF) model:  ACCt =α0 + α1CFt +εt     (2) 
Dechow-Dichev (DD) model: ACCt = α0 + α1 CFt + α2 CFt-1 + α3 CFt+1 + εt       (3) 
 
where ACC is total accruals, and CFt-1, CFt, and CFt+1 are one-period lagged, current, and one-
period future operating cash flows, respectively. Note that although DKW and DD explicitly 
model only working capital accruals, Ball and Shivakumar (and DKW) empirically examine total 
accruals as the dependent variable in Eqs. (2) and (3). I return to this issue below.  
All three models, Jones, CF, and DD, rely on a similar idea: accruals are expected to be a 
function of firms’ real business activity, where real business activity is predominantly captured 
by increases or decreases in firm sales. The Jones model includes the change in sales directly in 
the model. The CF and DD models are both derived from the accruals process framework 
developed by DKW. DKW begin with a model that relates sales to accruals and derive 
contemporaneous and lead-lag relations between accruals and operating cash flow under the 
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explicit assumption that accruals resolve timing and matching problems. DD extends DKW by 
recognizing that current period accruals that are not a function of prior period and future period 
cash flows may be of lower quality. The CF model is a special case of the DD model in that it 
uses only current period cash flow as a workhorse to capture business activity and therefore 
assumes that all accruals have the same relation with business activity.  
As described in detail below, Ball and Shivakumar’s main tests of conditional 
conservatism consist of adjustments to Eqs. (1), (2), and (3) using total accruals (i.e., including 
both short-term and long-term accruals) as the dependent variable. Of the three accruals models 
described above, only the Jones model attempts to explain variation in short- and long-term 
accruals. The Jones model explicitly models long-term accruals from depreciable assets, 
although it excludes other non-working capital accruals such as deferred taxes and restructuring 
charges.  DKW and DD acknowledge that long-term accruals are associated with cash flows, and 
also potentially resolve timing and matching problems. Guay and Sidhu (2001) document 
empirically that long-term accruals in general, as well as individual components of long-term 
accruals such as depreciation and deferred tax, resolve timing and matching problems in cash 
flows in much the same way as short-term accruals. Further, they show that the cross-sectional 
variance of aggregate long-term accruals as well as individual components of long-term accruals 
are large, suggesting that an accruals model designed only to explain working capital accruals is 
likely to explain total accruals with substantial error. DKW and DD note that modeling long-
term accruals is more difficult than working capital accruals because the relation between long-
term accruals and cash flows occurs over a longer and more variable time period. Thus, the CF 
and DD accruals models in Eqs. (2) and (3) above have no explicit modeling of long-term 
accruals. 
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It is useful to consider how well working capital accrual models are expected to perform 
in tests by Ball and Shivakumar, DKW, and many other empirical papers that examine total 
accruals, inclusive of both working capital and long-term accruals. Ball and Shivakumar provide 
some insight into this question in additional detail contained in the conference version of the 
paper that has been dropped in the published version. Specifically, they examine the explanatory 
power of the DD model when individual components of accruals are used as the dependent 
variable in the accruals regressions. The coefficients on the explanatory variables in the DD 
model are quite similar across regressions where individual working capital accruals (e.g., 
accounts receivable and inventory) are the dependent variables. However, when individual 
components of long-term accruals (e.g., depreciation) are the dependent variables, the 
coefficients are very different from those of regressions with short-term accruals as the 
dependent variables. This suggests that constraining all short-term accruals to have the same 
relation with the explanatory variables may not be a problem, but that constraining the 
coefficients across short-term and long-term accruals is likely to reduce the explanatory power of 
the models. Further, some of the more interesting accruals associated with asymmetry and 
conservatism, such as restructuring charges, goodwill impairments, and asset write-downs, are 
long-term accruals. The modeling of long-term accruals appears to be a topic for future research.   
 
3. Gains and loss recognition role of accruals 
Ball and Shivakumar argue that the accruals models described above can be improved by 
recognizing that in addition to resolving timing and matching problems in working capital cash 
flows, accruals also serve to recognize economic gains and losses in a timely manner. They refer 
to gains and losses as shocks to current period cash flows plus revisions in the expectation of 
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firms’ future cash flows. The authors provide intuitive examples of gains and losses in short-term 
accruals such as changes in the value of trading securities, inventory write-downs, and 
receivables revaluations. They also provide examples of gains and losses in long term accruals, 
such as restructuring charges, goodwill impairment charges, and asset impairment charges.  
Considerable empirical evidence documents that the timely recognition of gain and loss 
accruals yields an earnings measure that improves upon cash flows as a measure of firm 
performance (e.g., Dechow, 1994; DKW, 1998). Watts (2003) makes the often overlooked point 
that the timely recognition of both gain and loss accruals increases the efficiency of the earnings 
measure for debt and compensation contracting: 
Agency cost-reducing contracts include debt contracts between the firm and holders of 
the firm's debt, management compensation contracts, employment contracts, and cost-
plus sales contracts. Contracting parties demand timely measures of performance and net 
asset values for compensation and debt contract purposes. Ceteris paribus, managerial 
performance measures in compensation contracts, such as earnings, are more effective 
when they are timely and reflect the effects of the managers' actions on firm value in the 
period in which the actions are taken. Timeliness avoids dysfunctional outcomes 
associated with managers' limited tenure with the firm, often referred to as the manager's 
limited horizon. For example, a manager may forgo positive net present value projects 
with near-term negative earnings because future earnings will reflect the benefits of the 
project after the manager has retired or left the firm (Watts, 2003a, pg. 211). 
 
Many researchers emphasize the importance of timely recognition of losses in writing efficient 
debt, compensation, and other contracts over accounting earnings. However, timely recognition 
of gains should also generally result in more efficient contracts written over earnings. This point 
should not be surprising. The exclusion of timely gain accruals makes earnings a less informative 
measure of firm performance, and it is difficult to construct a contracting setting where less 
informative earnings make the contract more efficient. Thus, contracts written over earnings are 
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expected to be more efficient when both loss and gain accruals are recognized in a timely manner 
(subject to cost considerations as described in Section 4).2 
Ball and Shivakumar identify four proxies for economic gains and losses: (1) current 
period cash flows, (2) change in cash flows, (3) industry-adjusted cash flows, and (4) market-
adjusted stock returns. They include these proxies as additional explanatory variables in Eqs. (1), 
(2) and (3) above. As described in Section 4, they also allow the coefficients on economic gains 
and losses to differ for gains as compared to losses. For example, in Eq. (1), when the change in 
cash flows is used as the proxy for economic gains and losses, the authors’ regression is 
estimated as follows:  
 
ACCt =α0 + α1∆REVt + α2GPPEt + α3∆CFt + α4D∆CFt + α5D∆CF*∆CFt +εt     (4) 
 
where ∆CFt is the change in operating cash flow from period t-1 to t, and D∆CFt is a dummy 
variable equal to one when ∆CFt is negative, and zero otherwise. 
Before turning to the authors’ main tests, which relate to predictions and inferences about 
the incremental timeliness of accruals in reflecting losses (i.e., α5), I discuss the frequently 
overlooked timeliness of gains. The authors do not explore the question of whether accruals 
recognize gains in a timely manner. Specifically, they make no predictions or inferences about 
the coefficient on the proxy for economic gains and losses that they estimate in their accruals 
regressions (e.g., α3 in Eq. (4) above).  
The reason the authors do not draw inferences about the timeliness of gains appears to be 
two-fold. First, they note that the inference from their cash-flow-based proxies for economic 
                                                 
2 See Guay and Verrecchia (2005) for a more detailed discussion of the role of timely recognition of both gains and 
losses in earnings.  
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gains and losses is complicated by the correlation between these proxies and some of the 
independent variables in the accruals models. For example, there is a clear correlation between 
the cash-flow-based proxies for economic gains and losses and the lagged, current and future 
cash flows that DD include to capture the quality with which working capital accruals resolve 
matching problems. The authors’ concern about the influence of these correlations appears valid. 
Although the coefficient on economic gains and losses, α3 in Eq. (4) above, is expected to be 
positive (i.e., accruals should increase with gains and decrease with losses), the authors find a 
significant negative coefficient in their Table 3, Panel B. This finding suggests that the 
coefficient on Ball and Shivakumar’s proxy for economic gains and losses in this specification is 
dominated by the smoothing function of working capital accruals modeled by DKW, that is, by 
the negative predicted relation between cash flows and working capital accruals.        
The second reason that the authors do not explore whether accruals reflect both timely 
gains and losses appears to be something of a lack of interest within the literature. As noted 
above, subject to cost considerations, timely recognition of both losses and gains is a desirable 
property of earnings and accruals that is expected to improve the efficiency of contracts. 
Although Ball and Shivakumar briefly list explanations for why financial reporting might exhibit 
timelier recognition of losses than gains, there is no apparent reason to believe that contracts 
demand only losses to be timely (in Section 4 below, I expand on this issue). However, while the 
timeliness of losses has been the focus of much recent study, the timeliness of gains has been 
largely ignored. As a result, our understanding of the timeliness of gains is lacking, and the 
general question of whether and when accruals recognize gains in a timely manner is left 
unanswered for future research.  
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4. Asymmetric recognition of gains and losses in accruals 
Ball and Shivakumar’s main hypothesis is that accruals exhibit conditional conservatism 
in recognizing gains and losses, that is, accruals exhibit timelier recognition of economic losses 
than gains. Their tests explore whether accruals models that explicitly consider this asymmetry 
have greater explanatory power than models that do not. 
Although a large volume of empirical literature beginning with Basu (1997) documents 
that accounting earnings do exhibit asymmetry with respect to gains and losses, there is 
considerable debate over the economic determinants of this asymmetry.3 One interpretation of 
the literature is that the demand for asymmetrically timely earnings can be explained by the 
following two part contracting-related hypothesis: 1) accrual accounting is a costly activity, and 
2) contracting parties have a greater demand for timely loss recognition than timely gain 
recognition. 
Both parts of the hypothesis are critically important. First, accrual accounting must be 
non-trivially costly. As noted above, earnings that incorporate only timely losses are less 
informationally efficient than earnings that incorporate both timely losses and gains. Therefore, 
if accrual accounting is not very costly, earnings that incorporate both timely losses and gains are 
expected to be preferred for contracting (as well as being preferred for valuation and other uses 
of accounting earnings).  
Is accrual accounting actually costly? Although detailed discussion of the direct or 
indirect costs of accrual accounting is somewhat sparse in the conservatism literature, it certainly 
seems likely that the costs are non-trivial. Constructing expectations and changes in expectations 
about future cash flows related to assets and liabilities can be time-consuming and both capital 
                                                 
3 For excellent summaries of the theory and empirical work on conservative accounting, see Ball (2001) and Watts 
(2003a and 2003b). Also, see Guay and Verrecchia (2005) for a more detailed discussion of related points on the 
demands for symmetric and asymmetric recognition of gains and losses in contracting. 
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and labor intensive. Further, as noted by Watts (2003a), verifying such expectations can be 
costly, and there may also be greater litigation costs associated with forecasts of future cash 
flows that subsequently turn out to be incorrect.  
The second part of the hypothesis is that the contracting-based demand for timely gains 
and losses is not symmetric. Note that the issue here is not whether shareholders, debtholders and 
managers would prefer to contract over earnings that incorporate only timely losses – it has 
already been noted above that they would generally prefer to contract over informationally 
efficient earnings that incorporate both timely losses and gains. Instead the issue is whether and 
why the benefits derived from information about losses are greater than the benefits derived from 
information about gains. Debt and compensation contracts are widely used in the literature to 
motivate the demand for asymmetric timeliness of gains and losses, and so I focus my discussion 
on these two settings. 
Watts (2003a) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005a) argue that timely gain recognition is in 
less demand than timely loss recognition because managers will voluntarily disclose information 
about gains. However, because the financial accounting system explicitly excludes the timely 
recognition of many economic gains, it is not clear how such voluntary disclosures about gains 
are verified at low cost outside the accounting system. It is difficult to write contracts over 
voluntarily disclosed information. Therefore, it is not clear how debt and compensation contracts 
will be more efficient when they are written over a combination of audited financial earnings that 
incorporate timely losses and nonaudited voluntary disclosures about gains. 
However, the arguments in the literature about voluntary disclosure of gains may not be 
critical to constructing an argument for why debt contracting would demand relatively more 
timely information about losses than gains. Debtholders’ financial claims are more sensitive to 
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bad news about profitability or the value of net assets than they are to good news. For example, 
holders of debt in a financially healthy firm are more likely to find significant bad news relevant 
to valuing their claims, and are less likely to find good news important in valuing their claims. 
As a result, if both timely gains and losses are costly to incorporate into earnings, debt 
contracting will create a demand for relatively more of the timely loss accruals (and contracting 
parties will be willing to wait until difficult-to-verify gains are realized, at which point they 
become easier to verify and are incorporated into earnings).  
The demand in executive compensations contracts for asymmetric recognition of gains 
and losses is less obvious. Because accrual accounting and cash accounting result in the same 
total earnings over time (subject to clean surplus and other standard assumptions), preferences 
over accounting systems for compensation contracting are related to managerial horizon issues. 
A large literature documents the existence of both underinvestment and overinvestment by 
managers with short horizons. For example, as Ball and Shivakumar (2005a) note, if losses are 
not recognized in a timely manner in earnings, managers with short horizons may not 
discontinue poorly performing projects. There is a flip side however, as recognized in the quote 
by Watts (2003a) cited above. If gains are not recognized in a timely manner, managers with 
short horizons may forgo investing in positive NPV projects.4 Therefore, if we make the 
assumption that it is efficient to write compensation contracts over accounting earnings (as 
opposed to contracting over stock returns or other performance measures), it is not clear why or 
                                                 
4 As an example of a setting where timely gain and loss information might be important, consider a recent study by 
Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2005), who examine in a global setting the speed with which managers increase or 
decrease investment flows in response to improved or deteriorating investment opportunities, respectively. The 
focus of the authors’ analysis is whether managers decrease investment flows in response to deteriorating investment 
opportunities more quickly when accounting information about losses is more timely. However, the authors’ 
descriptive statistics indicate that the speed with which managers increase investment flows in response to improved 
investment opportunities varies as much across countries as the speed with which managers decrease investment 
flows in response to deteriorating investment opportunities. This comparison suggests that providing incentives for 
managers to take positive NPV projects may well be equally as important as providing managers with incentives to 
shut down negative NPV problems.  
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how a compensation contract would be more efficient by excluding timely information about 
economic gains. 
It is also important to note that as long as the second part of the contracting-based 
hypothesis is valid (i.e., the existence of an asymmetric demand for gain and loss accruals), it is 
not necessary that gain and loss accruals have asymmetric costs. In other words, since net 
benefits equal gross benefits less costs, the net benefits of recognizing losses can be greater than 
that of gains even when the costs are the same. This is helpful because it is not always clear how 
much more costly gains are to verify and incorporate into earnings than losses. For example, the 
accounting rules dictating impairments of tangible and intangible assets require managers to 
estimate future cash flows that will be generated by the assets. Those estimates may yield lower 
or higher values for the assets, and it is unclear why verifying one outcome is more costly than 
the other. As another example, the lower-of-cost-or-market rule for inventories requires 
managers to make income-decreasing accruals when estimates of the value of inventory suggest 
a decline in value, but not an increase in value. It is not clear why estimates of increases in 
inventory value are more costly to verify than decreases in inventory value. 
Regardless of the reasons behind asymmetry of gains and losses in earnings, it is 
empirically well-documented that earnings are indeed asymmetric in the recognition of gains and 
losses. Therefore, it is important to incorporate this empirical regularity into accruals models. To 
test the prediction that accruals models have greater explanatory power when this asymmetry is 
considered, Ball and Shivakumar construct a piecewise linear regression that allows the 
coefficient on proxies for economic gains and losses to vary across positive and negative values, 
as in Eq. (4) above. The incremental coefficient on losses, α5 in Eq. (4), is predicted to be 
positive. Across all three accruals models (Jones, CF, and DD), and for all proxies for economic 
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gains and losses, accruals are shown to recognize economic losses in a more timely manner than 
gains. Further, the authors show that this result is robust to many empirical specifications.  
Is the asymmetric recognition of economic gains and losses in accruals best modeled with 
a piecewise linear specification with a single ‘kink’? It is difficult to say. Certainly, one could 
argue that multiple kinks could improve the specification because some accruals are explicitly 
designed to be a nonlinear function of gains and losses. For example, consider the two-part rules 
for long-lived asset impairments. First, firms must determine whether the undiscounted expected 
cash flows from the asset are less than the net book value of the asset. Conditional on this being 
the case, the asset impairment is based on the difference between the net book value of the asset 
and the discounted expected cash flows from the asset. If the undiscounted expected cash flows 
are greater than the net book value, no impairment is recognized. Thus, the impairment rules are 
designed to ignore small economic losses on long-lived assets (e.g., where expected cash flows 
decline, but not by too much), but to fully recognize the decline in value for large economic 
losses. It remains to be seen whether more complex piecewise linear or non-linear specifications 
of accruals will improve upon the Ball and Shivakumar specification. However, any such 
improvements to this model should be grounded in a well-specified theory of the appropriate 
functional form.  
In summary, the Ball and Shivakumar findings are important and should be non-
controversial given existing literature on the asymmetry with which earnings recognize positive 
and negative news. Future research that models the accrual process will be better specified by 
incorporating this asymmetry. 
 
5. Unexpected accruals and discretionary accruals 
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Within the accounting literature, the most commonly examined aspect of accrual 
expectation models is the residuals, or unexpected accruals. Numerous papers use estimates of 
unexpected accruals as proxies for accruals quality or the discretionary use of accruals. It is well-
known that the residuals from these models estimate discretionary accruals with considerable 
error (e.g., Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995; Guay, Kothari and Watts, 1996). There are two 
general types of error: 1) the residuals can contain nondiscretionary accruals, and 2) the 
estimates of nondiscretionary accruals (i.e., the predicted or fitted values from the models) can 
contain discretionary accruals. What are the implications of these errors and how does the Ball 
and Shivakumar approach help mitigate these problems?  
First, let us consider the case where the residuals from accruals models contain 
nondiscretionary accruals. This is likely to be the case when firms experience performance-
driven shocks to earnings that cause accruals to deviate from their normal relation with the 
independent variables in the accruals model. For example, the Jones model assumes that the 
accrual component of earnings is a constant proportion of changes in sales and PP&E. When a 
firm builds up inventory in anticipation of future growth in sales, the Jones model considers this 
inventory activity to be a discretionary accrual. At best, this specification problem will cause 
measurement error that makes it difficult for researchers to document predicted relations between 
discretionary accruals and economic variables of interest. More problematic however, is the fact 
that the error in discretionary accruals is often correlated with firm performance, and in many 
settings, the researcher examines a stimulus for earnings management that is also correlated with 
firm performance. For example, consider the researcher who examines whether firms attempt to 
inflate stock price by managing earnings upward prior to accessing the capital markets. Firms 
raising capital generally have experienced positive growth and performance, and these firms will 
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likely be found to have positive discretionary accruals simply because the Jones model fails to 
capture these shocks (regardless of whether there exists true earnings management caused by 
capital raising activities). In these cases, the researcher’s tests will be biased toward finding 
earnings management (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995).  
Ball and Shivakumar’s approach recognizes that accruals in the presence of poor 
performance are expected to be asymmetric relative to accruals in the presence of good 
performance. As a result, their adjustment to the accruals models may aid researchers in 
mitigating performance-induced measurement error. To provide evidence on this point, it would 
be interesting to identify specific settings or samples of firms where the Ball and Shivakumar 
approach alters inferences about discretionary accrual behavior vis-à-vis inferences from existing 
accruals models. 
A related development in the quest to purge performance-driven measurement error in 
discretionary accruals is put forward by Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (KLW, 2005). KLW 
suggest a matched-sample approach, which can be useful when the variable of interest is not 
well-modeled and the functional form between the variable of interest and the explanatory 
variables is not well understood. KLW choose return on assets as their matching variable under 
the assumption that a key component of the measurement error in discretionary accruals is the 
presence of nondiscretionary accruals that are correlated with firm performance. The benefit of 
such an approach is that discretionary accruals should be purged of a strong correlation with firm 
performance. The cost however is that the researcher must compute performance-matched 
discretionary accruals as the difference between two estimates of discretionary accruals (the 
treatment firm and the control firm) that are both measured with substantial error. Therefore, 
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although the resulting discretionary accrual measure is expected to be less biased with respect to 
firm performance, it is also expected to contain greater noise. 
It is possible that the Ball and Shivakumar approach and the KLW approach accomplish 
similar things. The former recognizes that the accruals process is correlated with firm 
performance as measured by proxies for economic losses, while the latter recognizes that the 
accruals process is correlated with firm performance as measured by return on assets. Ball and 
Shivakumar recognize that the accruals process is asymmetric in firm performance. Likewise, 
KLW’s matched-sample approach implicitly allows for an asymmetric relation between accruals 
and firm performance. In fact, the KLW approach allows for not only asymmetry, but also for 
the possibility that the relation between accruals and firm performance is a more complicated 
functional form. Indeed, one of the motivations behind the KLW approach is that accruals 
models misclassify nondiscretionary accruals as discretionary for firms with extreme earnings 
performance. It would be interesting to know whether the Ball and Shivakumar and KLW 
approaches are each incrementally helpful in estimating discretionary accruals. 
The second measurement error problem with discretionary accruals models is that 
estimates of non-discretionary accruals may contain discretionary accruals. As noted in KLW, if 
the motivation for discretionary accruals is related to the explanatory variables in the accruals 
models, the models will misclassify some discretionary accruals as nondiscretionary. For 
example, the Jones model includes change in sales as a proxy for growth-driven working capital 
accruals. Therefore, if firms that experience a decline in sales attempt to meet earnings targets 
via positive discretionary accruals, the residuals from the Jones model will not capture all of the 
discretionary accruals. This implies that if the question the researcher wants to answer is, “What 
is the magnitude of discretionary accruals being used by a given set of firms,” models that 
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control for firm performance will understate true discretionary accruals. On the other hand, if the 
motivation for discretionary accruals is not recent firm performance (or at least is not highly 
correlated with firm performance), such as discretionary accruals around grants of executive 
stock options, the residuals from the accruals should contain a substantial fraction of the 
discretionary accruals. Neither the Ball and Shivakumar approach nor the DLW approach 
appears to resolve this second measurement error problem.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Understanding the accrual process and developing good models that accurately capture 
the behavior of accruals is a key issue in a broad range of accounting research. Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) incorporate conditional conservatism, the asymmetric timeliness with which 
accruals recognize economic losses, into the existing accruals models.  The authors’ findings are 
important and consistent with existing literature on the asymmetry with which earnings 
recognize positive and negative news, and should result in better specified models of the accrual 
process.  
At the same time, the authors’ analysis highlights several issues for future research. First, 
the modeling of when and to what extent accruals recognize economic gains is left as an 
unanswered question. The timely recognition of economic gains is expected to improve 
contracting efficiency, and even though loss recognition is more timely than gain recognition, it 
would be helpful to know more about the timeliness of gains and how it should be modeled. Ball 
and Shivakumar are not able to interpret their regression coefficients on economic gains due to 
econometric issues, and so leave this question for future research. Second, the modeling of 
working capital accruals has received the most attention in the literature and as a result working 
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capital accruals are better understood than long-term accruals. More accurate models of long-
term accruals will likely improve the overall modeling of the accrual process. Finally, Ball and 
Shivakumar’s results suggest improvements that can be made to models of the discretionary 
accrual component of earnings. Recent work by Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) argues that 
performance-matched discretionary accruals measures are necessary because accruals 
expectations models do not adequately control for the relation between accruals and firm 
performance. As models of expected accruals become more complete (e.g., by incorporating 
asymmetries in the recognition of economic gains and losses), performance matching may be 
less necessary or may require a performance-matching variable that is different from the return 
on assets measure advocated by Kothari et al. (2005).  
 20
References  
 
Ball, R., 2001, “Infrastructure requirements for an economically efficient system of public 
financial reporting and disclosure,” Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, R. 
Litan and R. Herring (eds), Washington: Brookings Institution Press: 127-169.  
Ball, R., and L. Shivakumar, 2005, “The role of accruals in asymmetrically timely gain and loss 
recognition,” forthcoming in Journal of Accounting Research. 
Ball, R., and L. Shivakumar, 2005a, “Earnings quality in U.K. private firms: comparative loss 
recognition timeliness,” Journal of Accounting & Economics 39, 83-128. 
 
Basu, S., 1997, “The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings,” Journal 
of Accounting & Economics 24, 3-37. 
 
Bushman, R., Piotroski, J., and A. Smith, 2005, “Capital allocation and timely accounting 
recognition of economic losses: International evidence,” Working paper, University of 
Chicago. 
 
Dechow, P., 1994, “Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm performance: The 
role of accounting accruals,” Journal of Accounting & Economics 18, 3-42. 
 
Dechow, P. and I. Dichev, 2002, “The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual 
estimation errors,” The Accounting Review 77, 35-59. 
 
Dechow, P., Kothari, S.P., and R. Watts, 1998. “The relation between earnings and cash flows,” 
Journal of Accounting & Economics 25, 131-214. 
 
Dechow, P.M., Sloan, R.G., and A. P. Sweeney, 1995. “Detecting earnings management,” The 
Accounting Review 70, 193-225. 
 
Guay, W., Kothari, S.P., and R. Watts, 1996, “A Market-Based Evaluation of Discretionary-
Accruals Models,” Journal of Accounting Research 34, Supplement: 83-105. 
  
Guay, W., and B. Sidhu, 2001, “The Usefulness of Long-Term Accruals,” Abacus 37: 110-131. 
 
Guay, W., and R. Verrecchia, 2005, “Discussion of Bushman and Piotroski (2005) and theory of 
conservative accounting,” Working paper, University of Pennsylvania. 
 
Jones, J., 1991, “Earnings Management during import relief investigations,” Journal of 
Accounting Research 29, 193-228. 
 
Kothari, S.P., Leone, A., and C. Wasley, 2005, “Performance matched discretionary accrual 
measures,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 39 163–197. 
 
Watts, R., 2003a, “Conservatism in accounting part i: Explanations and implications,” 
Accounting Horizons 17 (3), 207-221. 
 21
 
Watts, R., 2003b, “Conservatism in accounting part ii: Evidence and research opportunities,” 
Accounting Horizons 17 (4), 287-301. 
 
